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CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions
Brian Broughman∗
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal
side payments in connection with the sale of their firms. Side payments
differ from golden parachutes in that they are negotiated ex post in
connection with a specific acquisition proposal, whereas golden
parachutes are part of the executive’s employment agreement negotiated
when she is hired. While side payments may benefit shareholders by
countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale, they can also be
used to redistribute merger proceeds to management. This Article
highlights an overlooked distinction between pre-merger golden
parachutes and merger side payments. Similar to a legislative rider
attached to a popular bill, management can bundle a side payment with
an acquisition that is desired by target shareholders. Thus, even if
shareholders would not have approved the side payment for purposes of ex
ante incentives, they may support the payment as part of a take-it-orleave-it merger vote. Because side payments are bundled into merger
transactions, voting rights cannot adequately protect shareholders
against rent extraction. My analysis helps explain empirical results,
which show that target CEOs sometimes bargain away shareholder
returns in exchange for personal side payments. I conclude with legal
reforms to help unbundle side payments from the broader merger vote.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In connection with its 2005 acquisition of The Gillette Company,
Procter & Gamble offered temporary employment plus a side payment
worth approximately $23 million to Gillette’s then-CEO, James M.
Kilts. 1 The side payment was structured as a non-compete agreement,
and it was in addition to the change of control payouts (“golden
parachutes”) included in Mr. Kilts’s pre-merger employment
contract. 2 Mr. Kilts was the primary individual negotiating on behalf
of Gillette. 3 The merger proposal, which included an 18% premium
for target shareholders, 4 was ultimately endorsed by Mr. Kilts,
unanimously supported by Gillette’s board of directors, 5 and approved
by 96% of the firm’s voting shareholders. 6
Though the magnitude of benefits received by Mr. Kilts is
unusual, 7 the basic use of side payments is not. In acquisitions of both
privately- and publicly-held firms, it is common for acquirers to offer
the CEO (and sometimes other top executives) of the target firm
either post-merger employment or some form of side payment. 8 Side
payments are structured in a variety of different ways, including (i)
merger bonuses (often structured as non-compete agreements); (ii)
augmented parachute entitlements; (iii) employment or post-merger
consulting contracts; (iv) ‘unscheduled’ stock options during merger

1. Gillette Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) I-67 (May 25, 2005).
2. Id. at I-66 to I-67.
3. See id. at I-22 to I-25.
4. Lloyd Vries, Procter & Gamble Acquires Gillette, CBS MONEYWATCH (Jan. 28, 2005),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/procter-gamble-acquires-gillette/.
5. Id.
6. Procter and Gillette Shareholders Approve $57 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/business/procter-and-gillette-shareholdersapprove-57-billion-merger.html.
7. See Charles Forelle & Mark Maremont, Gillette CEO Payday May Be Richer, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110738943232044343 (summarizing
the benefits awarded to Kilts).
8. See infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. Side payments are not limited to the
target CEO. Other members of the target firm’s senior management team sometimes receive
side payments as well; however, to facilitate meaningful comparisons empirical studies typically
focus on the CEO. See id. To the extent that other members of senior management are involved
in merger negotiations the analysis in this Article applies to such individuals as well as to the
CEO. For ease of terminology and to track existing data, however, I will typically refer to the
target CEO rather than to the loose collection of target managers involved in merger
negotiations who happen to receive side payments.
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negotiations; or (v) a board seat with the acquiring firm. 9 The dollar
amounts paid out in such side deals are substantial. CEOs of publiclyheld target firms typically receive a larger aggregate payout from
merger side deals ($2 million) 10 than from pre-merger golden
parachute arrangements ($1.5 million). 11
On the one hand, side payments may benefit shareholders by
countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale. Because an
acquisition is likely to cause the target CEO to lose her job, future
income, and various private benefits, she may credibly threaten to
block the sale unless she is offered post-merger employment with the
acquiring firm or a lucrative side payment to compensate for her loss.
To be sure, support of management is not technically required to sell
a firm. But as a practical matter, it is difficult to sell over the objections
of the CEO and senior management. The CEO is typically the primary
party negotiating the deal on behalf of the target, and even when this
is not the case, an uncooperative management team may destroy
considerable value that the acquirer hopes to gain from the deal,
suggesting that all parties can benefit from a well-structured side
payment. Viewed in this light, merger side payments can help
counteract managerial entrenchment and align the interests of the
CEO with shareholders (“Incentive Alignment”). 12
Alternatively, there is a risk that side payments may be used to
enrich the CEO at shareholders’ expense (“Rent Extraction”). 13 The
target CEO—acting as bargaining agent for the corporation—may
accept a lower merger premium in exchange for personal gain through
a side payment that does not benefit shareholders as a class. Empirical
studies have found lower acquisition premiums associated with
mergers in which the target CEO receives a side payment.14
Furthermore, some forms of side payments are associated with

9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. This may understate the benefits that
CEOs receive from merger side payments, as it does not include the value of post-merger
employment with the acquiring firm. Including an estimated value for post-merger employment
suggests that target CEOs receive an average benefit of approximately $4.3 million from merger
side deals. Id.
11. See infra Table 1.
12. See infra Section III.A.
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See infra Section III.B.
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abnormal positive returns for the acquiring firm, suggesting collusion
between the target CEO and acquirer in pricing deals. 15
Despite this evidence, legal scholars have given little attention to
problems associated with merger side payments. Presumably one
reason for this omission is that the law already requires that any extra
benefits—including side payments—received by senior management
in an acquisition be disclosed to shareholders and that the entire
transaction be subject to both board and shareholder approval.16
Informed shareholder approval generally mitigates concern related to
conflicts of interest. 17 Given these procedural safeguards, why do
empirical studies nonetheless find evidence of rent extraction? Put
another way, why would a target’s shareholders and board of directors
vote to approve a merger that gives money away to the CEO? The
existing literature in both law and finance does not have a good answer
to this question.
Addressing this gap, I propose a new theory for merger side
payments that explains why rent extraction persists despite existing
legal protections for shareholders. While a typical agency conflict is
driven by shareholders’ inability to observe bad behavior and lack of
incentive to monitor management, merger side payments present a
different problem. Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular
bill, management can use its agenda-setting power to bundle a side
payment with a sale of the firm that is desired by target shareholders.
Shareholders cannot oppose the side payment unless they are willing
to block the entire deal and give up the acquisition premium
associated with the sale. 18 Disclosure and voting rights do not help.
Indeed, even if shareholders would not have approved the side
payment for purposes of ex ante incentives, the payment may rationally
receive ex post shareholder support as part of a take-it-or-leave-it
merger vote.

15. See infra Section III.B.
16. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 50 (3d ed. 2012).
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2016). In fact, shareholder approval is
one reason that merger side payments are often entitled to protection under the business
judgment rule. See id.; see also infra Section III.C.
18. Acquisitions typically occur at a significant premium above the pre-deal share price.
See, e.g., Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on
Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 103, 106 (2001) (showing an average median premium
between 34% and 47%).
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My analysis highlights an important but overlooked distinction
between golden parachutes and merger side payments. Golden
parachutes are part of an executive’s employment agreement
negotiated at the time she was hired; they are not linked to a specific
acquisition. While a parachute may change the threshold level at which
a CEO is willing to support a sale of her firm, it does not create a
conflict with respect to the CEO’s negotiation of merger premium. 19
The CEO still has every incentive to bargain for a high shareholder
premium. By contrast, side payments create an incentive for the CEO
to trade away shareholder premium in exchange for a larger side
payment. Consistent with this distinction, empirical studies find more
evidence of rent extraction associated with side payments than with
golden parachutes. 20
Legal and extra-legal constraints limit, but do not remove, rent
extraction. 21 For example, an auction may force an acquirer to devote
its funds to shareholder premium and the threat of tax penalty may
limit side payments over a threshold level. 22 Nonetheless, these
constraints are incomplete and unable to eliminate the risk of rent
extraction. Indeed, as long as side payments are disclosed to
shareholders, corporate law largely shields them from judicial review,
giving shareholders little ability to counteract the CEO’s agendasetting power. 23
I conclude by proposing a small reform to corporate law to help
unbundle side payments from the broader merger vote. In particular,
firms should be permitted to opt into a heightened fiduciary standard
by placing language in the firm’s charter requiring that any side benefit
received by the CEO and possibly other members of senior
management, must be approved by a separate vote, upon which the
broader acquisition cannot be contingent. To avoid the possibility that
shareholders may decline to approve an ex post side payment, firms
selecting this option would be encouraged to address the problem ex
ante by adopting golden parachutes and related agreements. I explain

19. See infra note 112.
20. See infra notes 111–114, 118–121 and accompanying text.
21. The prospect of a second bidder may limit excessive side payments because such
payments would divert funds away from the purchase price and thereby place the original bidder
at a competitive disadvantage in any resulting auction for the target. This constraint, however, is
only binding to the extent that there are multiple parties who might bid for the target firm. See
infra Section V.A.
22. See infra Section V.B.
23. See infra Section V.D.
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how this proposal could reduce the CEO’s agenda-setting power with
respect to side payments, while still giving firms flexibility to
compensate CEOs for negotiating a sale of the business.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II
describes empirical studies of merger side payments in connection with
the sale of publicly- and privately-held firms. Part III considers two
explanations for the use of side payments: incentive alignment and rent
extraction. Part IV develops a new theory for rent extraction through
bundled side payments. Specifically, it demonstrates that target CEOs
can use control over the corporate agenda to bundle an opportunistic
side payment into a desired merger transaction, thereby making it
impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without
also voting against the merger. Part V considers legal and extra-legal
constraints that may limit merger side payments. Part VI proposes a
small change to corporate law to help unbundle side payments from
the broader acquisition. Part VII concludes.
II. EVIDENCE OF MERGER SIDE PAYMENTS
While an acquisition may cause the target CEO to lose her job and
reduce her future income, it can also provide her with a variety of
financial benefits. The first comprehensive study of the various
benefits—including side payments—that CEOs of publicly-held
targets receive in connection with the sale of their firms was conducted
by Jay Hartzell, Eli Ofek, and David Yermack; their study is based on
data from the sale of 311 publicly traded targets in the late 1990s. 24
For privately-held targets, the only empirical work documenting side
payments is my own research with Jesse Fried, 25 which is based on the
sale of 50 startups in the early 2000s.
Side payments are not the only type of benefit that target CEOs
receive when their firms are sold. Executives, like other shareholders,
also receive any premium applied to their equity in the target firm. For
example, an acquirer may be willing to pay $40 per share for a target
firm that had been trading for $30 per share prior to the acquisition,

24. Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms
Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD., Jan. 2004, at 37, 41 [hereinafter Hartzell].
25. See generally Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319 (2013) [hereinafter
Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks]; Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Renegotiation of
Cash-Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384 (2010).
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a 33% premium over the pre-existing share price. Combining stock
and option gains, the average target CEO receives equity appreciation
of just under $5 million when her firm is sold. 26 This amount does not
include the base value of the CEO’s equity holdings prior to the
announcement of the acquisition. It only measures the premium
applied to the CEO’s equity. Most CEOs also receive a substantial
change of control payout, or “golden parachute” (averaging $1.5
million), 27 based on their pre-merger employment contracts.
Side payments are, however, a substantial component of the
merger benefits that a target CEO typically receives. Merger side
payments are extra amounts given to the target CEO that are
negotiated in connection with a specific merger transaction. These
benefits did not exist, even as contractual entitlements, prior to the
negotiation of the merger. Other members of the target’s senior
management team may also receive side payments; 28 however, to
facilitate comparison, empirical studies typically focus on the CEO. 29
Existing studies document four general categories of merger side
payments. First, parachute payments are sometimes “augmented by
the target’s board of directors at the time that it approves the merger.”30
Though technically structured as a golden parachute, this benefit
functions as a merger side payment since it was negotiated in
connection with a specific merger deal. The average target firm CEO
who received this benefit was awarded $3.3 million, but since only
12% of target firm CEOs received an augmented parachute, the
average payout for the entire population of target firm CEOs is
$400,000 (= $3,300,000 x 0.12). 31

26. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 45.
27. Id. (finding that 69% of the CEOs in their sample had golden parachute arrangements
in place at least a year prior to the acquisition. For tax reasons, the golden parachute payment is
typically equal to three times the CEOs salary and bonus in the years prior to the deal. I.R.C. §
280(G) (2012) limits corporate deductions for golden parachute payments to this amount).
28. See, e.g., Gillette Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) I-67 to I-68 (May 25, 2005)
(describing equity awards and retention agreements given to four senior executives of Gillette in
addition to the CEO, Mr. Kilts).
29. See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text.
30. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 46 (emphasis added) (“In these cases, boards vote to
increase the CEO’s parachute value and shareholders learn of the change after the fact from an
SEC filing; a little more than half of this subgroup did not have any parachute in place prior to
the augmentation.”).
31. See id.
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Second, target CEOs may receive payment from the acquirer for
post-merger consulting or for signing a non-compete agreement.32
Finance studies refer to such payments as “merger bonuses.” 33 The
average target firm CEO who received a merger bonus was awarded
$4.4 million; this benefit was received by 27% of target firm CEOs,
implying that the average merger bonus payout for the entire
population of target firm CEOs is $1.2 million (i.e. 1,200,000 =
4,400,000 x .27). 34
Third, the target board may grant unscheduled stock options to its
CEO during merger negotiations. 35 While option grants in other
contexts can have incentivizing effects when awarded in connection
with a merger proposal, such grants function as an alternative form of
side payment. The average target firm CEO who received an
unscheduled option during deal negotiations was awarded an extra
$3.5 million; this benefit was received by 13% of target firm CEOs,
implying that the average value of unscheduled options granted
during deal negations for the entire population of target firm CEOs is
$455,000 (= $3,500,000 x 0.13). 36
Fourth, many target CEOs receive either continued employment
(50%) or a board seat (57%) with the acquiring firm. 37 Such benefits
are explicitly negotiated in connection with the M&A deal. As a
prominent New York lawyer explained, “I have had a number of
situations where we’ve gone to management looking to do a [merger]
and been stopped at the door until a compensation arrangement was
signed, sealed and delivered[.]” 38 CEOs who are retained by the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 54.
34. See id. at 46 (calculated by multiplying $4,400,000 by 0.27); cf. Eliezer M. Fich,
Edward M. Rice & Anh L. Tran, Contractual Revisions in Compensation: Evidence from Merger
Bonuses to Target CEOs, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 338, 345 (2016) [hereinafter Fich, Contractual
Revisions] (finding that 23% of target CEOs receive a merger bonus by using a larger dataset of
M&A deals; the mean merger bonus payout in their study was $1.6 million).
35. Eliezer M. Fich, Jie Cai & Anh L. Tran, Stock Option Grants to Target CEOs During
Private Merger Negotiations, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 413, 419 (2011) [hereinafter Fich,
Option Grants].
36. Id. (finding, when using data from 920 acquisitions conducted from 1999 to 2007,
that the rate of unscheduled option grants during merger negotiations (13%) is significantly
higher than the baseline rate of unscheduled stock option grants (9%)).
37. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 46–47.
38. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Those Sweet Trips to the Merger
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/07/
Mall,
N.Y.
business/executive-pay-a-special-report-those-sweet-trips-to-the-merger-mall.html.
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acquiring firm typically receive a larger salary (18% greater) and a
larger bonus (34% greater) than they did with the target firm. 39
Conceptually, a CEO retention agreement should only be treated
as a side payment to the extent that the executive is overpaid relative
to any value she creates for the acquiring firm. Because the retained
individual presumably adds value to the acquirer and the total benefits
that the individual may receive under such agreement are unknown at
closing, it is difficult to measure the side payment component of a
retention agreement. Target CEOs who obtain a position as an officer
of acquiring firms receive “about $4.7 million less in negotiated cash
pay from golden parachute augmentations and special merger
bonuses.” 40 “These results imply that acquirers overtly pay certain
CEOs to surrender managerial control over their firms’ assets, or
equivalently, that some CEOs ‘purchase’ executive jobs in the buyer
by foregoing cash payments that they might otherwise
have obtained.” 41
Target CEOs generally receive either post-merger employment or
a side payment. 42 This suggests that the average CEO values continued
employment at approximately $4.7 million. Though this figure may
seem high, it is consistent with evidence that departed CEOs often do
not find subsequent work, or find work at a substantially lower-paying
job. 43 Given that 50% of target CEOs receive continued employment,
the mean value of continued employment for the full population of
target-firm CEOs may be approximately $2.35 million (50% of
$4.7 million).
Putting this together, we can estimate the aggregate value of
merger side payments for CEOs of publicly-held targets. Excluding
the value of benefits received by CEOs retained by acquirers, the mean
CEO receives just over $2 million in merger side payments. If we
include acquirer retention agreements (valued as above), the mean
CEO can expect approximately $4.3 million in merger side benefits.
Either way merger side payments are an economically significant

39. Hartzell, supra note 24, at 48. Many of target CEOs do not stay with the acquirer for
even a full year after the merger, and when they depart they typically receive a lucrative severance
payment (mean of $3.8 million) from the acquirer. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 54.
41. Id. at 39.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 49–55; Anup Agrawal & Ralph A. Walkling, Executive Careers and
Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids, 49 J. FIN. 985, 985–1014 (1994).
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payout, larger than the average value paid out under pre-merger
parachute arrangements ($1.4 million). 44 These results are
summarized in Table 1.
Due to limited data availability for privately-held firms, there is less
evidence on the use of merger side payments in private acquisitions.
One exception to this is my own research with Jesse Fried. 45 We used
interviews to collect information related to the acquisition of 50
venture-backed startups. We found that the CEO received a nonretention merger bonus in 16 of the 50 acquisitions. 46 For our full
sample, the average merger bonus was approximately $0.5 million (or
$1.6 million for the 16 deals that provide a merger bonus). 47 In dollar
terms, the merger bonuses that we find in private acquisitions are
modest, at least as compared to public deals. However, when
computed as a fraction of the acquisition price, these are large bonuses
(for the 16 deals which provide a merger bonus, the bonus was 6.6%
of the total sale price). We also found that top executives of the target
firm were offered retention contracts in 38% of the acquisitions in our
study. 48 While the generalizability of our study—involving only VCbacked startups—to all private acquisitions may be questioned, our
research at least shows that merger side payments are not limited to
public acquisitions and can be a significant source of compensation for
executives of private as well as public targets.

44. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 45. Hartzell et al. collect data from SEC filings made
in connection with the sale of each of these firms. This lets them measure various payouts that
the CEO of the target firm receives in connection with the sale. Id.
45. Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 25.
46. See id. at 1351.
47. See id. at 1350.
48. See id. at 1351 n.91 (reporting that 19 founders (i.e. 38% of the 50 firm sample)
received a retention agreement from the acquirer).
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Table 1: Benefits Received by CEOs of Publicly-Held Targets 49
PRE-MERGER BENEFITS
Type
Share gains
Option gains
Parachute

%
n/a
n/a
69.0

Total

Mean $ Value
4,247,863
656,451
1,465,251

Source
Hartzell, et. al. (2004)
Hartzell, et. al. (2004)
Hartzell, et. al. (2004)

$6,369,565

MERGER SIDE PAYMENTS
Type
Monetary Benefits
Augmentation of
parachute
Additional bonus
Unscheduled
Option

%

Mean $ Value

Source

12.1

393,545

Hartzell, et. al. (2004)

27.2
13.0

1,201,011
455,000

Hartzell, et. al. (2004)
Fich, et. al. (2011)

Other Merger Benefits
CEO retained as
50.3
officer
CEO retained as
57.1
director

n/a

Hartzell, et. al. (2004)

n/a

Hartzell, et. al. (2004)

Total (excluding
retention)

$2,049,556

Total (including
retention) 50

$4,349,556

49. Table 1 lists benefits––financial and otherwise—received by the CEO in connection
with the sale of her firm. Data is from Hartzell, supra note 24, at 44–46 (including 311
acquisitions involving publicly held firms from 1995 to 1997), and from Fich, Option Grants,
supra note 35 (including 920 acquisitions involving publicly held firms from 1999 to 2007).
50. For a discussion of the value of continued employment, see supra note 40–43 and
accompanying text.
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III. TWO EXPLANATIONS: INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT AND RENT
EXTRACTION
More difficult than showing the existence of merger side payments
is determining whether target shareholders benefit from these
arrangements. This Part considers two alternative explanations for the
frequent use of merger side payments: incentive alignment and
rent extraction.
A. Incentive Alignment
A side payment may benefit shareholders by countering
managerial resistance to an efficient sale. To illustrate, consider the
following hypothetical.
Suppose Target has 10 million shares outstanding that are
currently trading for $40/share (market cap = $400 million). Acquirer
is considering buying Target for strategic purposes. Due to expected
synergies, Acquirer would be willing to pay up to $500 million for
Target, producing a net gain in social welfare equal to $100 million.
Though not technically required, assume a deal—and the
accompanying social gain—can only go forward with the support of
the CEO of Target. The CEO will support an acquisition only if it is
in her personal interest to do so. As is typical, the CEO is the primary
party negotiating the deal on behalf of Target and if she threatens to
hold up the deal, the parties believe that considerable value would be
lost. Consequently, Acquirer is only interested in buying Target with
the CEO’s support. 51
Suppose the CEO holds 1% (100,000 shares) of Target’s
outstanding equity, currently valued at $4 million (100,000 x
$40/share). The CEO also values her job. Assume a $3 million
buyout is the minimum payment that the CEO would voluntarily
accept to give up her employment position at Target. This figure
reflects the marginal value to the CEO of her job (including future
compensation, private benefits, status, etc.) relative to her next best
employment opportunity. Putting her share value together with her
51. Alternatively, we could instead assume that a deal remains possible, but that Acquirer
would only be willing to pay a smaller amount if a deal is done without the CEO’s support. This
may limit the magnitude of side payment that a CEO can bargain for, since Acquirer could
threaten to do the deal without the CEO if the CEO makes unreasonable demands. Nonetheless,
the basic intuition regarding incentive alignment remains valid because the CEO could still hold
up the deal to the extent that it is worth more with her cooperation.
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employment value, the CEO will only support a sale if she receives at
least $7 million from the deal. This follows since the sale will require
the CEO to give up both her equity holdings (worth $4 million) and
her job (worth $3 million). The benefit to the CEO could come from
either (i) the price offered to Target shareholders (i.e., the merger
premium), or (ii) from a side payment offered to the CEO. For ease
of analysis, I assume the CEO is not entitled to a golden parachute. 52
Given this setup, we can explore the effect of side payments on
merger negotiations. Without a side payment, the only benefit that
the CEO receives from a sale is the premium offered for her shares.
The shareholder premium, however, would need to be very large to
compensate the CEO for giving up her job. In the current example,
the CEO would need to receive $7 million for her 1% equity interest
in Target, meaning Acquirer would need to pay $700 million (or
$70/share) for the entire company. Unfortunately, Acquirer only
values Target at $500 million. At this price, the CEO would only
receive $5 million for her equity. Without a side payment the CEO
will block the sale of Target. The result is entrenchment. Society loses
out on the $100 million surplus that a sale would create.
It is easy to see that a merger side payment could solve this
problem. For example, a side payment equal to exactly $3 million
would fully compensate the CEO for giving up her job, and align the
CEO’s incentives with those of shareholders. With this side payment,
the CEO’s marginal welfare in any merger negotiations would depend
solely on the price paid to Target shareholders. This is also the
standard justification for golden parachutes. The idea is to remove the
entrenchment motive by fully compensating the CEO for her loss of
position, and thereby encourage the CEO to focus on
shareholder welfare.
In the current example, a $3 million side payment makes an
acquisition possible. For instance, Acquirer may offer to buy Target
for $480 million (or $48/share) and give CEO a $3 million side
payment. Acquirer would be paying a total of $483 million for a
company that it values at $500 million. The CEO would receive $7.8
million in total benefits from the deal ($3 million side payment plus
$4.8 million for her equity), giving her a small gain relative to her

52. Furthermore, for simplification, I assume Acquirer would not receive any extra value
from getting the CEO to sign a retention agreement or a non-compete agreement. Put
differently, Acquirer simply needs to get the CEO to support the sale, but the structure of any
side payment offered to the CEO does not impact merger surplus.
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prior status; and Target shareholders would receive a 20% merger
premium, a gain of $80 million ($480 million compared to $400
million market cap). To be sure, a small portion of the merger surplus
($3 million) is necessarily being redirected to the CEO, but compared
to no deal this is a definite improvement for Target shareholders, 53 and
it preserves the social benefit created by the acquisition.
Some may find this explanation of incentive alignment troubling
because it includes payments for conduct that a CEO acting on
shareholders’ behalf ought to perform regardless of financial
incentives. At least in spirit, fiduciary obligations suggest that the
CEO ought to support a sale of Target whenever it is in the best
interests of Target shareholders. In response, it should be noted that
the CEO’s conflict is unusual in that serving the shareholder interest
could mean giving up her personal livelihood. Outside of corporate
law, fiduciary relationships do not generally require the agent to
sacrifice her career for fiduciary ends. 54 Furthermore, while blocking
an acquisition may be against the spirit of fiduciary law, it is difficult
to enforce this obligation in the M&A context. Management could
always claim that the reason they are blocking the sale is that the price
offered to target shareholders is too low. 55 Given the various methods
of valuing a business 56 and the wide degree of discretion afforded
management in opposing a takeover, this defense is difficult for an
objecting shareholder to overcome. Thus, even if extracting a merger
53. Indeed, the CEO’s loss of $3 million in private benefits by giving up her job should
be included in a full social-welfare analysis, meaning this hypothetical merger only creates $97
million in true social gain, all of which is going to the shareholders—$17 million to the Acquirer
shareholders (in the form of savings on the transaction purchase price) and $80 million to Target
shareholders. The $3 million side payment is merely compensating for the CEO’s loss of
private benefits.
54. For example, employees are agents of their employer and consequently owe fiduciary
obligations to the employer. Yet, an employee is not obligated to cease working for the employer
based on belief that someone else may be more qualified for the job.
55. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949–53 (Del. 1985)
(discussing where the target board rejected the acquirer’s two-tiered tender offer, finding, after
deliberating reasonably and in good faith, that the offer was coercive and inadequate); see also
Miguel Helft & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Yahoo Rejects Microsoft Bid Again, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/technology/07cnd-soft.html?_r=0 (reporting
that Yahoo rejected Microsoft’s second takeover offer, deeming the bid to be insufficient).
56. Various methodologies for valuing a business include (without limitation): discounted
cash-flow analysis, comparable company analysis, comparable transaction analysis, ratio analysis,
asset valuation, and weighted-average approaches. For a discussion of such methodologies in
the context of appraisal litigation, see Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance
Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2003).
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side payment may seem improper, practically speaking it makes sense
to think of the payment as serving an incentive alignment function.
Empirical studies suggest that side payments are indeed used for
incentive alignment. Side payments arise more often in settings where
the CEO’s loss of private benefits creates heightened incentives to
otherwise block the merger. 57 For example, if the Target CEO is not
retained or her employment agreement provides below average
change of control benefits, she is more likely to receive a merger side
payment, and the value of such payment will be larger. 58 Merger side
payments may “act as a form of ex-post settling up . . . whereby target
CEOs are made whole for the benefits they lose when firms are sold.” 59
According to estimates from Fich, Rice, and Tran, “a $1 decline in the
parachute payment raises the [merger] bonus by $0.67.” 60 One
interpretation consistent with such data is that CEOs with inadequate
change-of-control protection require a larger side payment to align
their incentives with those of shareholders. 61 Collectively, these results
suggest that side payments are often used to overcome managerial
entrenchment that could otherwise derail an acquisition. 62
B. Rent Extraction
A side payment can be understood as a renegotiation of the CEO’s
employment contract. In the contract theory literature, renegotiation

57. See Hartzell supra note 24, at 40; see infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
58. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 39 (“[W]e find strong inverse associations between
[side payments] and the likelihood that the target CEO remains as an officer of the acquirer.”);
see also Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 365 (explaining that in low synergy targets,
side payments provide an adjustment to the compensation received by target CEOs in takeovers).
Also, there is some evidence that merger side payments are positively correlated with prior
excess compensation.
59. See Hartzell, supra note 24, at 39 (citing Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 (1980)) (internal quotations omitted).
60. See Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 347.
61. Id. at 339, 341 (explaining side payments “may resolve the potential conflict of
interest between the CEO and shareholders. In this situation, an extra cash benefit provided
during an acquisition attempt can move the target CEO to support and enable a deal the CEO
would otherwise oppose.”).
62. As further evidence of this, even with widespread use of side payments, shareholders
of target firms as opposed to acquirers appear to capture almost all of the gains associated with
merger activity. See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 18, at 110 (showing that target
firm shareholders receive all of the economic gains associated with merger activity and acquiring
shareholders receive no benefit and in some periods even receive negative returns).
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is a standard solution to holdup problems. 63 Provided the parties are
not constrained by wealth, renegotiation will ensure an ex post
efficient outcome. 64 Renegotiation, however, may have distributive
consequences, and can lead to inefficient investment behavior ex
ante. 65 Applied to the current context, the parties use a form of
Coasian bargaining to negotiate around the CEO’s holdup, ensuring
efficient ownership of the Target firm. 66 The side payments needed to
reach this result, will lead to a redistribution of merger surplus away
from Target shareholders and to the benefit of the Target CEO (and
possibly the Acquirer).
In the hypothetical in Section III.A, the merger surplus is not
redistributed because it is assumed that the CEO will simply receive
the minimum side payment necessary to achieve incentive alignment.
But this need not be the case. Indeed, the CEO and Acquirer have an
incentive to collude in the design of the side payment and pricing of
the merger. This incentive occurs because for each additional dollar
paid to Target shareholders, the CEO only receives $0.01 (her 1% pro
rata interest). By contrast, the CEO receives 100% (minus taxes) of
each dollar allocated as a side payment. The Acquirer can obtain the
CEO’s consent at a much lower cost by allocating more of the funds
to the side payment and less to the Target shareholders. The parties,
of course, cannot set the merger price so low that Target shareholders
might reject the offer, but they can capture a larger portion of
the surplus.
To illustrate with an example, consider the following extension of
the hypothetical. Instead of a $3 million side payment, the Acquirer
could offer a $13 million side payment in exchange for lowering the
purchase price from $480 million to $460 million. These terms make
both Acquirer and Target CEO better off, as compared to the
arrangement above. The CEO now gets $17.6 million, as compared

63. See Brian Broughman, Investor Opportunism, and Governance in Venture Capital, in
VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 347, 350 (Douglas
Cumming ed., 2010) (discussing the use of renegotiation as a solution to problems created by
opportunism and ex post hold-up).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at
1, 1–44. In the current example, the CEO of the target firm has something akin to a property
right over the assets of the target firm, suggesting that the CEO’s consent is needed to transfer
these assets to the acquirer.
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to $7.8 million above, 67 and Acquirer pays a total of $473 million
instead of $483 million. Target shareholders are the only group
harmed by this arrangement; instead of $480 million they now receive
$460 million. The quid pro quo in this bargain may not be explicit, as
counterfactual offers may not be observed. Nonetheless, it is easy to
see how a CEO’s bargaining incentives may be compromised by a
large side payment.
Table 2 provides a summary of the expected payoffs to each party
under the various arrangements described above. The first row shows
that without a side payment there is no merger and the parties fail to
capture any benefit. The last two rows show the division of merger
surplus under the two hypothetical deals described above. To avoid
double counting, the last column excludes the CEO’s payoff as
shareholder, and only counts the value of the side payment minus the
loss of the CEO’s current job at Target.
Table 2: Merger Payoffs with Alternative Side Payments
Side
Payment
None
$3M
$13M

Merger
Price
Deal
blocked
$480M
$460M

Marginal Payoff to Each Party
Acquirer
Target
Target
SHs
CEO
0
0
0
$17M
$27M

$80M
$60M

0
$10M

Empirical studies of side payments find evidence of rent extraction.
Numerous studies find that the premium offered to target
shareholders is significantly lower in deals where the target CEO
receives either a side payment or post-merger employment. 68 In a
67. The CEO receives $4.6 million for her 1% equity interest, plus a $13 million
side payment.
68. Numerous publications establish evidence that side payments lead to a lower
premium. See, e.g., Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Buhui Qiu,
Svetoslav Trapkov & Fadi Yakoub, Do Target CEOs Trade Premiums for Personal Benefits?, 42 J.
BANKING & FIN., May 2014, at 23. Additionally, several studies evidence that post-merger
employment leads to a lower premium. See, e.g., Hartzell, supra note 24; Qiu, Trapkov &
Yakoub, supra 68; Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from
“Mergers of Equals,” 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 60 (2004). But see Leonce L. Bargeron, Frederik P.
Schlingemann, René M. Stulz & Chad J. Zutter, Do Target CEOs Sell Out Their Shareholders to
Keep Their Job in a Merger? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14724, 2009),
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recent finance study, for example, the authors found that target
shareholders receive a 5% lower merger premium when the CEO is
offered employment by the acquirer. 69 Similarly, “targets granting
their CEOs unscheduled stock options while confidential merger talks
are in progress earn acquisition premiums about 4.4 percentage points
lower.” 70 Furthermore, side payments cost target shareholders more
than they benefit the target CEO, 71 suggesting that target CEOs are
in essence colluding with the acquirer to redistribute a portion of
target shareholder gains between them. 72
The existence of lower merger premium in deals that involve a side
payment or CEO retention does not necessarily imply rent extraction.
It may be that side payments are endogenous to low-quality targets
and deals with low-potential synergies. A buyer can offer a larger
shareholder premium as the merger surplus (i.e. synergy) increases.
Consequently, in an acquisition that creates a large surplus, the CEO
may support the deal even without a side payment because the
premium applied to her equity holdings fully compensates her for the
loss of her job. Conversely, if an acquisition involves a small surplus
the opposite is true and a side payment may now be necessary to
obtain the CEO’s support. Consistent with this, one type of side
payment—merger bonuses—is more common in deals with a low
merger synergy. 73 The low synergy explanation, however, does not
apply to other types of merger side payments. 74 In a study that
addresses the endogeneity of CEO retention, Qiu, Trapkov, and

http://www.nber.org/papers/w14724 (finding that post-merger employment does not lead to
a lower merger premium). Another refinement on this basic result comes from Hartzell, supra
note 24, at 58 (finding evidence that target CEOs holding less than the median amount of equity
in the target firm are more likely to sacrifice equity appreciation for personal benefit). This result
suggests that a CEO’s pre-merger equity holdings can serve as a partial constraint on
rent extraction.
69. See Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68, at 28.
70. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 414.
71. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Qiu,
Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68; Wulf, supra note 68.
72. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 414 (finding that “[d]eal value is reduced by
almost $62 for every $1 of profit target CEOs obtain from unscheduled stock options.”). But
see Shane Heitzman, Equity Grants to Target CEOs During Deal Negotiations, 102 J. FIN. ECON.
251–52 (2011) (finding no evidence of rent extraction through side payments).
73. See generally Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 34, at 338.
74. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35 (discussing unscheduled stock
options to target CEOs in mergers); Hartzell, supra note 24 (examining the benefits received
by target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions).
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Yakoub still find a strong negative correlation between CEO retention
and merger premium, suggesting that this result is not driven by
selection bias. 75 Rather, retained CEOs do not seem to bargain as
aggressively on behalf of target shareholders. 76
More problematic, acquirers capture a larger fraction of the
merger surplus in deals that involve a merger bonus or an unscheduled
option grant. 77
[T]he financial cost to target shareholders of [merger side payments]
would seem to exceed substantially the benefits received by their
CEOs. This imbalance, arising from a conflict of interest between
target CEOs and their shareholders, would seem to represent a
wealth transfer from shareholders of the target to shareholders of
the buyer. 78

Similarly, “bidder returns involving a target that issues its CEO
unscheduled stock options during private deal negotiations are about
2 percentage points higher.” 79 Consistent with rent extraction, these
results suggest a wealth transfer from target shareholders to both the
target CEO and to acquiring shareholders.
The puzzle with rent extraction is to understand why a target’s
shareholders would vote to approve a merger that gives money away
to the CEO. In the M&A context, side payments are disclosed to
shareholders and the entire transaction is subject to both board and
shareholder approval. 80 Informed shareholder approval generally
mitigates concern related to conflicts of interest. Given these
procedural safeguards, why do empirical studies of merger side
payments nonetheless find evidence of rent extraction?
The existing literature does not have a good answer to this
question. None of the finance studies discussed above explicitly
75. See Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68, at 10–17 (discussing the possibility of
selection bias due to the fact that only non-retained CEOs receive severance pay).
76. Id. at 26–27.
77. See generally Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24.
78. Hartzell, supra note 24, at 59.
79. Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35, at 415 (finding this result only applies to merger
bonuses and unscheduled option grants). But see Eliezer M. Fich, Micah Officer & Anh L. Tran,
Do Acquirers Benefit from Retaining Target CEOs? (June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://22financeforum.unizar.es/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/22financeforum_submissio
n_66_Do-acquirers-benefit-from-retaining-target-CEOs.pdf (finding that “acquirers do not
appear to benefit, in terms of merger announcement returns or long-run operating performance
from hiring the CEO of firms they acquire.”).
80. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 50.
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consider the approval process necessary to enter into a merger. 81
Rather, they treat rent extraction via side payments as just another
agency cost, perhaps caused by board capture. 82 This explanation,
however, is better suited for the general discussion of managerial
decision making, where shareholders are not entitled to a formal
vote. 83 The next Part provides a new theory of rent extraction that
does not depend on board capture and explains why shareholder
voting, as currently exercised, cannot be relied on to prevent
opportunistic side payments.
IV. NEW THEORY: BUNDLING SIDE PAYMENTS INTO MERGERS
Target CEOs can use a form of agenda-setting power to bundle an
opportunistic side payment into a merger transaction that is desired
by shareholders. By bundling the side payment into a single yes-or-no
merger vote, management makes it impossible for target shareholders
to oppose the side payment without also voting against the merger.
Provided the bundled deal is better than the status quo (i.e. no
merger), shareholders will rationally vote in favor of the entire
transaction. 84 Thus, even if shareholders or directors would not have
approved the side payment if structured as a pre-merger golden
parachute, it is likely to receive shareholder support as part of a takeit-or-leave-it merger vote.

81. See Fich, Option Grants, supra note 35; Hartzell, supra note 24; Heitzman, supra
note 72; Qiu, Trapkov & Yakoub, supra note 68; Wulf, supra note 68.
82. There is a lack of theory work (i.e. formal models) specifically related to merger side
payments. Empiricists are consequently drawing on theories developed in related contexts (e.g.
executive compensation, golden parachutes, etc.) even though these settings differ from merger
side payments in important ways. For example, studies often cite to LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (2004), for evidence of rent extraction in executive compensation.
83. While legal scholars generally pay much more attention to the process by which
corporate decisions are authorized, they have almost completely overlooked the issue of merger
side payments.
84. Glencore’s efforts to acquire Xstrata illustrate this problem. See Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Gamesmanship in Xstrata-Glencore Merger Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/gamesmanship-in-xstrata-glencore-merger-vote
/?_r=0. The initial deal proposal included approximately $275 million in retention bonuses to
Xstrata management. Id. After deciding that Xstrata’s CEO, Mick Davis, would no longer head
the business post-merger, the proposed retention bonuses were reduced by $75 million, to an
aggregate bonus of $200 million, but shareholders remained upset. Id. Xstrata added a
shareholder-voting item on the retention bonuses, but it did not appear to give shareholders a
meaningful ability to oppose the side payments without also blocking the entire deal. See id.
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Originating in the political science literature, 85 bundling has
received attention from corporate law scholars. 86 Bundling has been
used to explain shareholder approval of dual-class recapitalizations in
the late 1970s and early 1980s 87 and, more recently, shareholder
approval of mergers where the surviving entity includes a staggered
board provision in its charter. 88 The general claim is that management
can bundle a provision that shareholders would normally oppose (e.g.
a staggered board) with a “sweetener” that shareholders desire. 89 This
Article extends the bundling insight to the analysis of merger side
payments and provides a theory to explain evidence of rent extraction
associated with such payouts.
The existing literature in corporate law focuses primarily on the
vulnerability of shareholders to bundled transactions. As described by
85. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 219 (1990)
(discussing bundling in the passage of a tax reform bill). See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Single
Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 808–09 (2006) (finding that
legislative compromises need to be bundled to improve political transparency); Kenneth A.
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL.
SCI. REV., Mar. 1987, at 85–104 (investigating why legislative committees are powerful and their
role as agenda setters).
86. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 864–65 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power] (discussing the impact of
bundling on reincorporation and charter amendment decisions); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1475 (1992) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Federalism] (examining the impact
of bundling on approval of proposals for reincorporation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1839–40 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom]
(discussing shareholder decisions in voting on bundled amendments); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1549, 1555–59 (2010)
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Kamar] (summarizing the literature on bundling in corporate law);
K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 1425 (generally addressing the bundling issue); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1577–79 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon,
Structure of Corporate Law] (examining bundling incentives); Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s
Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 143–49 (2010–2011) (discussing the impact that the federal
“Say on Pay” rule has on bundling). But see Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question:
The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1989)
(reviewing Gordon, Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 86) (suggesting that bundling does
not suggest coercion because shareholders will only approve of an outcome that is better than
the status quo).
87. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 48 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Ties that Bond].
88. See Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1552–53 (examining the impact on bundling
staggered board amendments with mergers to garner shareholder support).
89. Id.; Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 48.
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Bebchuk and Kamar, “[o]nly the board is authorized under state
corporate law to bring proposals for fundamental changes before
shareholders for approval. Shareholders lack parallel authority to
propose these changes and must vote on the board’s proposals on an
up-or-down basis.” 90 The shareholder position is analogous to the
inability of legislators to amend a bill coming out of committee under
a closed rule, which is exactly the setting in which political scientists
believe legislative riders are most problematic. 91 Provided the target’s
board is willing to endorse a side payment for its CEO, the
shareholders are stuck: unable to amend the merger agreement and
forced into a take-it-or-leave-it vote.
A. Bundling with an Independent Board
The above account of shareholder vulnerability implicitly treats
the target board of directors as a rubber stamp for the deal negotiated
by its CEO. There is certainly plenty of reason to believe that the
board may be favorably inclined toward the CEO. Some of the
directors may be corporate insiders working for the CEO, others may
have been nominated by the CEO, or they may favor the CEO due to
various forms of structural bias. 92 Furthermore, in the acquisition
context, it is not uncommon for target directors to receive a side
benefit themselves (e.g. a board seat with the acquirer) 93 in connection
with the deal.
But what if this is not the case? What if the directors on target’s
board are truly independent of the CEO, and motivated to act in
shareholder interests? Even with an independent board, there remains
some risk of rent extraction through merger side payments. Targets
generally rely on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement. 94 This
position gives the CEO considerable discretion to negotiate personal
benefits into the agreement that is sent to the board.

90. Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1557 (footnotes omitted).
91. See Gilbert, supra note 85, at 842–43.
92. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural
Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 834 (2007) (describing structural bias as bias that arises because of
“the cozy relationship [that] directors may have with officers . . . .”).
93. See generally Mira Ganor, Salvaged Directors or Perpetual Thrones?, 5 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 267, 269 (2010).
94. See Heitzman, supra note 72, at 257 (finding evidence that the CEO had authority
to negotiate on behalf of the target firm in more than half of the observations acquisitions).
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To be sure, instead of letting the CEO negotiate the merger
agreement, a board could appoint a special committee of independent
directors or other outside parties to negotiate on behalf of target
shareholders. Indeed, special negotiating committees are sometimes
used. 95 Their primary use, however, appears to be limited to
management buy-outs (MBOs) or other transactions involving rollover equity plans for target managers. 96 In an MBO, the target
management team is effectively the acquirer—often with support of a
private equity firm—buying out the target’s prior shareholders.
Because of this conflict, in the context of an MBO, it does not make
sense for target managers to negotiate on behalf of the target firm;
thus the board forms a special negotiating committee.
The special committee will typically retain an investment to assist
it and is also likely to conduct auctions to try to find an alternative
acquirer. 97 In some auction deals, a special committee is used because
management is one of the bidders for the target firm, even though the
ultimate acquirer is unrelated to management. 98 Extending this logic,
special committees could be used to deal with the conflict raised by
side payments even when there is no prospect of an MBO. This use of
the special committee, however, appears unusual. Using data from
public acquisitions that includes a large number of private equity deals,
Boone and Mulherin find that 24% of all acquisitions use a special
committee; however, when MBOs and private equity deals are
excluded, special committees remain infrequent. 99
Why don’t more boards appoint a special committee to negotiate
their sales? One reason, of course, is that some boards may effectively
be captured by their CEOs. But even for target boards acting in
shareholder interest, there is plenty of reason to rely on the CEO as a
primary negotiator. Boone and Mulherin, for example, suggest that
special committees may be at a disadvantage in settings where insider

95. See Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Who Monitors the Monitor? The Use of
Special Committees by Target Firms in Corporate Takeovers, J. CORP. FIN. 3 (forthcoming 2014),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119914000133.
96. See id. at 5.
97. See id. at 3.
98. See id. at 5.
99. See id. (showing that 58% of private equity deals and 42% of acquisitions by a private
bidder (which includes MBOs) use a special negotiating committee, while acquisitions by a
public acquirer only use a special negotiating committee in 9% (stock deals) to 20% (cash deals)
of the observed deals).
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knowledge is particularly valuable and can more easily be
communicated by the CEO. 100 Also, the appointment of a special
committee in settings that do not involve an MBO may be insulting
to the target CEO and may undermine management’s overall
cooperation in the transition process, possibly destroying value.
Keeping the CEO invested in the process through the completion
of the deal may be the best way to get a high price and preserve value
for the target shareholders. One way to ensure the CEO’s involvement
is to let her negotiate the deal. Conversely, if the CEO leaves prior to
closing or otherwise becomes uncooperative during negotiations, this
could destroy a great deal of the firm’s value to the acquirer. The
CEO’s holdup power makes it especially hard and costly for the board
to replace her as primary negotiator on behalf of the firm. The CEO
can use such holdup power to bargain for personal benefits. 101
With respect to shareholders, the CEO’s agenda-setting power is
formal, in that shareholders cannot initiate fundamental
transactions. 102 With respect to the board, the CEO’s agenda-setting
power is informal, based on the CEO’s ability to hold up a transaction
if her demands are not met. Unlike shareholders, a board can suggest
amendments to a merger agreement, but it cannot, while acting in
shareholders’ interest, credibly threaten to scuttle a merger deal
desired by shareholders simply to remove extra side payments. Rather,
the board needs to believe that it would get a better deal for its
shareholders by sending the CEO back to the bargaining table to ask
for a higher price.
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example: the
CEO of a target firm negotiates both (i) a merger agreement that
includes a 30% premium for target shareholders, and (ii) a personal
retention agreement which promises substantially higher pay—both
equity and salary—than she received under her previous employment
contract. Target’s board may believe that its CEO is being offered a
larger retention package than her marginal value to the acquiring firm
and thus infer that the acquirer would have been willing to pay a

100. See id. at 6.
101. To be sure, holdup power does not imply that the target CEO has unilateral control
over side payments. At a minimum, she must obtain the acquirer’s consent to a side payment.
However, the acquirer has an incentive to go along with such arrangements, provided it
receives a corresponding reduction in the price that it must pay to the target shareholders.
Empirical studies, as discussed above, find evidence that this tradeoff indeed occurs. See supra
notes 68–78.
102. See Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 86, at 1557.
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higher merger premium to target shareholders if the CEO’s retention
agreement were scaled back to a reasonable level.
But since the target board has no voice in the negotiation of the
retention agreement, how can it use this information? In theory, the
target board could try to demand a higher share price and ask its CEO
to give up some of her personal benefits if necessary to get the desired
price. Such demand, however, may be perceived as interfering with
the CEO’s ability to negotiate future employment. Worse still, if a 30%
premium is better than any alternative bidder is willing to offer, the
board cannot credibly threaten to vote down the existing
merger proposal.
The disagreement between the board and the CEO becomes a
game of brinksmanship, except one where the benefit of holding out
accrues primarily to the CEO, and the cost of a negotiation
breakdown falls primarily on diffuse shareholders. 103 All parties—the
target CEO, the board, and target shareholders—want the deal to go
forward. The board’s threat to block the deal because of the side
payment is not credible, but neither is the CEO’s threat to be
uncooperative if she does not receive the rent extracting payment.
Recognizing this dynamic, the board and the CEO can cooperate and
split the merger surplus between them in some way. This has the effect
of transferring shareholder surplus to the CEO.
In this setting, a shareholder-motivated board may simply
acquiesce to the CEO’s demands, especially recognizing that further
merger negotiation is costly and could cause the proposed deal to fall
apart. An independent board of directors may limit the extent of CEO
rent extraction compared to a board captured by the CEO, but as long
as the CEO remains the primary deal negotiator, even an independent

103. In governance conflicts where there are focused benefits and diffuse costs to an action,
it is often argued that collective action problems will hinder the larger and less organized group
and favor the smaller group. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). The analogy does not extend
perfectly to merger side payments, since the board can act as a representative of the diffuse
shareholders. Nonetheless, there is a single CEO who captures 100% of the benefits from a
merger side payment, negotiating against a board with multiple directors, none of whom
personally capture 100% of the marginal benefit that they create for shareholders by aggressively
challenging the CEO’s side payment and obtaining a higher acquisition premium. In this setting,
it is likely that an independent board of directors will acquiesce to some degree of rent extraction.
For an analysis of collective action problems that shareholders face in bundled transactions, see
Gordon, Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 86, at 1575–77; Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra
note 87, at 42–47.
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board cannot wholly prevent rent extraction. The CEO effectively
presents a bundled deal both to the shareholders and to the board of
directors. For the same reason that the shareholders are inclined to
vote in favor of the transaction—it is better than the status quo—so
too will the board.
This example emphasizes a second contribution this Article makes
to the literature on bundling in corporate law. As I hope to show, the
risk of rent extraction through merger side payments does not require
a captured board of directors. The problem of bundling is orthogonal
to standard debates about executive compensation 104 and debates in
corporate governance regarding director primacy 105 versus shareholder
empowerment. 106 Even if one believes that boards can generally do a
good job setting CEO pay, one should be concerned about boards’
ability to prevent rent extraction through merger side payments. Rent
extraction may reflect the CEO’s agenda-setting power in merger
negotiations, rather than board capture.

104. The academic literature is split on whether boards are sufficiently independent from
the CEO to engage in optimal contracting on behalf of shareholders or whether executive
compensation terms are captured by managerial power. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626–43 (2005) (reviewing
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried &
David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 82; Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation
Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 683–87 (2005); Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs
Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, at 1, 5; Steven N. Kaplan, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18395, Sept. 2012), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w18395.pdf.
105. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers:
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735
(2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789 (2007).
106. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43 (2003); Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 86; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai
Hintze, Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011).
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B. Side Payments vs. Golden Parachutes
The focus on bundling also highlights an important, but
overlooked, distinction between golden parachutes and merger side
payments. Golden parachutes are not bundled into a specific merger
transaction. Rather, parachutes are part of the CEO’s employment
contract and are negotiated at the time she is hired. 107 Ideally, a
parachute should compensate the CEO for private benefits that may
be lost if the firm is acquired and should align the CEO’s interests
with those of shareholders regarding a sale of the firm. This, of course,
is basically the incentive alignment hypothesis for side payments.108 To
be sure, a captured board of directors may harm shareholders by
awarding the CEO an excessive parachute payout, suggesting that rent
extraction is also possible via golden parachutes. 109 A board controlled
by the CEO increases the risk of CEO rent extraction through side
payments, parachutes, and various other forms of executive
compensation. 110 However, merger bundling only applies to side
payments. Thus, to the extent that bundling is an independent cause
of rent extraction, we should see higher levels of rent extraction
through side payments as opposed to golden parachutes.
Though this prediction has not been tested, there are a number of
studies showing that shareholders benefit from golden parachutes.
First, some studies find that shareholders experience positive abnormal

107. Legally, a golden parachute is a provision in an executive’s employment contract that
entitles the executive to a payment in the event of a change-in-control (defined to include a sale)
of the executive’s firm. For a discussion of when golden parachutes should be negotiated, see
Barbara Becker & Eduardo Gallardo, Golden Parachute Compensation Practice Pointers, HARV.
L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/02/golden-parachute-compensation-practice-po
inters/. Golden parachutes may be periodically renegotiated based on changed circumstances.
108. See supra Section III.A.
109. Like side payments, golden parachutes are open to multiple interpretations. Because
a golden parachute compensates the CEO for the loss of her job, she will support a sale at a
lower price. On the one hand, this may benefit target shareholders by reducing the entrenchment
motive and increasing the likelihood that a sale will occur. On the other hand, a golden parachute
may lower the CEO’s bargaining power relative to the acquirer. The acquirer knows the CEO
has a golden parachute and it anticipates that she will accept a lower merger premium. Thus, the
acquirer may be able to get a better price and capture a larger portion of the merger surplus
when negotiating with a CEO protected by a golden parachute. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, J. CORP.
FIN., Apr. 2014, at 140, 140–41 (describing tradeoffs associated with golden parachutes).
110. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 82, at 80–81.
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returns when golden parachutes are adopted. 111 Second, golden
parachutes increase the likelihood that a firm will receive an acquisition
offer and ultimately be acquired. 112 If we limit (i.e. condition) our
analysis to firms that are actually acquired, we find that target firms
that provide golden parachutes to the CEO receive smaller premiums;
however, this conditional effect is more than offset by the increased
likelihood of an acquisition. 113 Golden parachutes lead to higher
unconditional expected acquisition premiums. 114
To be sure, scholars express some concerns about golden
parachutes. Most notably, golden parachutes may undermine
managerial incentives for effort post-adoption. Concerns regarding
managerial incentives also apply to merger side payments, at least to
the extent that a side payment is anticipated. For example, in
anticipation of receiving a side payment an executive may not mind
having her firm acquired. The incentive problem, however, may be
worse in the context of a golden parachute since the payment is
contractually guaranteed. By contrast, a side payment is contingent
and thus may be viewed as a reward for effort prior to the sale. Along
these lines, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang find that firms “that adopt
GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and
subsequent to the period surrounding their adoptions.” 115 This
suggests that golden parachutes may increase managerial slack. 116 They
admit, however, that golden parachutes may be driven in part by
selection bias, as firms adopting a golden parachute tend to be worse
performing prior to the golden parachute. 117

111. See, e.g., Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive
Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 183–89 (1985).
112. Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 142–45, 153 (includes data on golden
parachutes for all firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database from
1990 to 2006. This database includes corporate governance “provisions for 1,400 to 2,000
firms, including all the firms belonging to the S&P500 and other firms considered important by
the IRRC,” with longitudinal variation for each firm across IRRC volumes.).
113. See id. at 140–47.
114. See id. at 140–41, 147–48; see also Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison
or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, J.
FIN. ECON., June 1995, at 3, 10–18 (explaining how to measure unconditional
acquisition premiums).
115. Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 140.
116. See id. at 153.
117. See id. at 151.
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In addition to selection concerns, the study by Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Wang also appears to suffer from omitted variable bias, as it fails
to control for straight severance protection. Straight severance
protection is a term in an executive’s employment contract that
entitles her to severance payments if she is terminated. It does not
require a change-in-control event to trigger the payment. Firms that
offer their CEO a golden parachute are more likely to also offer
straight severance protection. 118 In a new article, Andrew Lund and
Robert Schonlau re-estimate the regression models from Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Wang, but add a control variable for severance. 119 Lund
and Schonlau find that the negative effect on shareholder welfare (at
least after 2006) is not driven by golden parachutes, but rather by the
adoption of severance protection. 120 The fact that golden parachutes
have no effect on a firm’s performance once severance provisions are
accounted for suggests that golden parachutes may have little impact
on managerial slack. Overall, there appears to be more evidence that
shareholders benefit from golden parachutes than from side payments.
Though golden parachutes may lower the threshold level at which
a CEO is willing to support a sale of her firm, it does not create a
conflict with respect to the CEO’s negotiation of a merger premium.
As long as the golden parachute is fixed in advance, the CEO still has
every incentive to bargain for a high shareholder premium. By
contrast, side payments create an incentive for the CEO to trade away
shareholder premium in exchange for increased side payment. 121
Further empirical work is necessary to better assess the tradeoff
between a golden parachute and a merger side payment. My analysis
predicts a greater risk of rent extraction via merger side payments as
compared to golden parachutes, and I hope that future empirical
research tests this hypothesis.

118. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Golden Parachutes, Severance and Firm
Value, 16–20 (Oct. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682456
(noting a positive correlation between GPs and severance).
119. See id. at 28–29.
120. Id. at 4, 10–11.
121. The presence of a golden parachute does not appear to divert merger surplus away
from target shareholders to the benefit of acquirers. See Eliezer M. Fich et al., On the Importance
of Golden Parachutes, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1717 (2013). Large golden
parachutes are associated with higher acquirer returns, suggesting that excessive golden
parachute contracts can undermine the CEO’s bargaining power such that acquirers can get a
lower price. See id. at 1746–47. But the general result is that target shareholders benefit from
golden parachutes due to the increased likelihood of sale. See id. at 1748–51.
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V. EXISTING LEGAL AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS
Given the above, it is, perhaps, surprising that public commentary
has focused more on policing golden parachutes than on merger side
payments. Nonetheless, several laws that regulate golden parachutes
also apply to the use of merger side payments. In 1984, Congress
attempted to discourage excessive parachutes and side payments by
imposing tax penalties—sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal
Revenue Code—on executive payouts above a threshold level. 122 More
recently, the Dodd-Frank Act, which passed in 2010, requires
publicly-held firms to allow advisory shareholder votes on change-ofcontrol benefits, defined to include both golden parachutes and
merger side payments. 123 These requirements are in addition to
corporate law, securities regulation, and market forces which all work
to constrain merger side payments in various ways. The remainder of
this Part briefly describes existing legal and extra-legal protections for
shareholders against merger side payments.
A. Multiple Bidders for Target
Probably the biggest constraint on opportunistic side payments
comes from the prospect of a second bidder. 124 If side payments lead
to a lower merger premium, 125 as predicted by rent extraction, 126 this
creates an opportunity for a second bidder to enter the fray. In fact,
the presence of side payments from the first bidder may give the
second bidder an advantage in any resulting auction. The second
bidder can devote its funds solely to shareholders and does not need
to pay extra amounts to target executives. The second bidder can thus
outbid the first bidder by up to the amount of excess side payments
and still pay no more on a total basis.

122. See I.R.C. § 280G (2012); I.R.C. § 4999 (2012). For a discussion of these code
provisions, see Joy Sabino Mullane, The Unlearning Curve: Tax-Based Congressional Regulation
of Executive Compensation, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1045, 1050–56 (2011).
123. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 109, at 140; see also Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78n–1 (2012)).
124. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 62.
125. This can arise because target managers are more willing to accept a lower share price
when they receive side payments and because side payments eat up a portion of the total price
that an acquirer is willing or able to pay.
126. See supra Section III.B.
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The target CEO, the beneficiary of such side payments, may be
reluctant to engage a competing bidder. The second bidder, however,
can make its intentions known either by contacting the board with its
offer or by making a tender offer directly to the firm’s shareholders.
Ultimately, such tactics place a great deal of pressure on the target
CEO and the target board to remove excessive side payments and
focus on shareholder interests. For one thing, this setting may trigger
Revlon duties, placing additional legal obligations on the board to
focus exclusively on shareholder interests. 127 Also, target shareholders
will only accept a bundled transaction to the extent that it beats the
deal offered by the next highest bidder. In essence, the arrival of a
second bidder, or beliefs about latent bidders, transforms the status
quo—or, more technically, the shareholders’ threat position—from no
deal at all to whatever the competing bidder is offering. In anticipation
of such concerns the initial bidder may be reluctant to agree to large
side payments; it does not want to make a low-ball offer that attracts
competing bids.
If the market for corporate acquisitions were perfect (i.e. lots of
bidders) and if all acquirers brought identical synergies to the table,
the competition could eliminate rent extraction from merger side
payments. Competition would force bidders to give the entire merger
surplus to target shareholders. If a bidder tried to make a lower offer,
an alternative acquirer would outbid it. With perfect competition, the
acquirer would simply receive the market rate of return (i.e. no
surplus) and the target CEO would receive the minimum side
payment necessary for incentive alignment purposes. 128 Target
shareholders would receive the entire merger surplus—an
optimal result.
In reality, competition in the market for corporate acquisitions is
imperfect at best. Most completed mergers involve a single bidder
with some studies finding that over 90% of acquisitions involve only

127. When the sale or breakup of a firm is imminent, the firm’s directors have fiduciary
obligations—so-called Revlon duties—to get the best price possible for shareholders. See Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013).
128. The target CEO may also receive a retention contract or other benefits that increase
the value of the target firm to the acquirer. The key point, however, is that with perfect
competition, we would not need to worry about merger side payments as the market would
force these to the level that maximizes the price the acquirer would pay to target shareholders.
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one bidder. 129 Still, even if there is only one bidder, the target board
must still take some steps to insure it is getting the best price for
shareholders, as required by Revlon. 130 In practice, this means having
an investment bank prepare a valuation analysis suggesting a fair price
for the target and soliciting other bidders or running an auction to
provide an off-market check of the acquisition price. With a welldesigned sale process and no second bidder, it would be very difficult
for an objecting shareholder to prevail on a Revlon claim. 131 In the
absence of a second bidder, the target’s board has considerable
discretion to recommend a sale that includes a large side payment to
the CEO and other senior executives.
Furthermore, in a strategic acquisition context, merger synergies
likely depend on the identity of the buyer. Simply put, one buyer may
be able to pay more than any other, not because of financing
constraints but due to acquirer-specific synergies. 132 Such disparities
suggest that more bidders may not be sufficient to remove rent
extraction. If a less synergistic bidder were to emerge it would be
unable to drive the price sufficiently high to squeeze out excessive side
payments. Some degree of rent extraction remains. The result is a
semi-competitive market for corporate control, one that limits but
does not remove rent extraction.
B. Tax Incentives
The tax code—sections 280G and 4999—seeks to discourage
excessive change-of-control payments to senior executives of target

129. See Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, Merger Negotiations and
the Toehold Puzzle, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 158, 164 tbl.1 (2009) (finding based on more than 10,000
acquisitions from 1973 to 2002 that the target firm received bids from multiple parties in only
approximately 8% of the sample observations). Other studies find a higher degree of multi-bidder
contests. See, e.g., Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt & Richard Roll, Negotiations Under the Threat of
an Auction, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 243 (2010). Further, the lack of a second bidder does not
rule out latent competition.
130. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182.
131. Id. at 182–84.
132. To illustrate, assume there are unique synergies between acquirer A and a hypothetical
target firm. Acquirer A is willing to pay up to $150 million to buy target while other acquirers
are only willing to pay up to $100 million for the target firm. Acquirer A could offer excessive
side payments to the CEO of the target firm and still afford to pay $101 million for the target
firm. Market pressure from other bidders, unfortunately, cannot drive down such side payments
because the maximum amount that the other bidders are willing to pay for target is only
$100 million.
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firms. 133 A qualifying change-of-control payment is defined to include
both merger side payments and golden parachutes. 134 These code
provisions apply to both publicly-held and privately-held targets;
however, privately-held targets can waive the requirement with a
supermajority shareholder vote. 135 Provided that the aggregate
amount of such payments (side payments plus golden parachute
payments) is below a threshold level equal to three times the
executive’s average annual compensation over the past five years, these
code provisions have no effect. 136 On the other hand, if a senior
executive of the target firm receives side payments that exceed this
threshold level, then she faces a 20% excise tax on all excess payments,
in addition to the ordinary income taxes on such payments. 137 Also,
the corporation may not take a tax deduction for the
excess payments. 138
These sections of the tax code suggest an alternative explanation
for why empirical studies find a significant negative correlation
between merger side payments and golden parachute entitlements. 139
The finance literature generally attributes this finding to incentive
alignment, arguing that CEOs with inadequate severance protection
(i.e. below average golden parachutes) require a larger side payment
to align their incentives with those of shareholders. 140 An alternative
view is that executives with low golden parachute entitlements have
more cap-space under threshold payment level set by IRC section
280G, and thus can receive larger side payments without triggering a

133. I.R.C. §§ 280G(a), 4999 (2012).
134. The definition of a parachute payment in § 280G(b)(2)(A) is so sufficiently broad
that it includes both golden parachutes and what I refer to as merger side payments.
135. The requirements of sections 280G and 4999 are waived for privately-held firms if (i)
the firm has fewer than 100 shareholders and only one class of stock or (ii) a separate shareholder
vote supported by at least 75% of the firm’s shareholders is taken to authorize the side payment.
See Susan Dixon & Jose Singer-Freeman, Private Corporations and Section 280G of the Code,
PRACTICAL LAW CO. (2012), http://www.fdh.com/bulletin/0002.pdf.
136. See definition of “excess parachute payment” in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(1) (2012) (“[A]n
amount equal to the excess of any parachute payment over the portion of the base amount
allocated to such payment.”) and “base amount” in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) (2012) (“[T]he
individual’s annualized includible compensation for the base period.”).
137. See I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2012).
138. See I.R.C. § 280G(a) (2012).
139. See, e.g., Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 35; see also Hartzell, supra note 24.
140. See, e.g., Fich, Contractual Revisions, supra note 35; see also Hartzell, supra note 24.
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tax penalty. 141 Unfortunately, existing research has not clarified the
impact that these tax provisions have on side payment levels.
It should be noted that sections 280G and 4999 in no way
prohibit large side payments. Indeed, this is precisely the point of
using a tax; the law taxes —rather than prohibits—excessive payouts
to target executives in connection with a merger. The CEO of a target
firm can negotiate for a merger side payment that exceeds three times
her average base pay. Furthermore, a CEO may negotiate for a grossup payment from the target corporation to cover any additional tax
liability that he faces as a result of IRC section 4999. Indeed, having
the corporation pay the CEO’s tax liability does not appear to be an
unusual outcome, 142 even though it leads to the incongruous result
that shareholders ultimately pay the cost and are made worse off by a
tax provision designed to protect shareholders from excessive changeof-control payments. 143
C. Securities Regulation
Securities regulation protects shareholders through two primary
mechanisms: (i) disclosure and (ii) a prohibition against fraud or
deception. Consequently, in its proxy statement a target firm is
obligated to disclose side payments, or related benefits, received by its
CEO in connection with the acquisition. 144 Disclosure alerts
shareholders to possible conflicts with the CEO, but disclosure does
not give shareholders any meaningful ability to oppose an excessive
side payment. In fact, even with full disclosure it may be perfectly
rational for shareholders to vote in favor of a bundled merger
transaction, regardless if it results in rent extraction. Jeff Gordon notes
the inadequacy of disclosures as a remedy against bundling in the
context of dual-class recapitalizations. 145 Many of the dual-class

141. Because the definition of a parachute payment in I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A) (2012)
includes both golden parachutes and side payments, the use of golden parachutes creates a
deterrent for also granting side payments.
142. See Mullane, supra note 122, at 1054.
143. See id.
144. In its DEF14A filing, a target firm is obligated to disclose any economic interests that
its directors and executive officers have in the merger that is different from, or in addition to,
their interests as stockholders. See Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 (2016).
145. See Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 42–43. For a broader discussion of the
limitations of disclosure, see Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure (Pub. Law
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recapitalizations studied by Gordon included an increase in annual
dividend payments (desired by shareholders) in connection with the
use of a dual-class structure that weakened shareholder-voting rights
(opposed by shareholders). 146 Disclosure of the loss of voting rights
associated with the dual-class structure did not prevent shareholders
from approving these recapitalizations. 147 Full disclosure of side
payments insulates the target firm against securities fraud, but
disclosure by itself does not provide shareholders with any meaningful
ability to voice their opposition to such arrangements, other than to
vote against the entire merger. 148
In addition to disclosure, securities regulation also addresses side
payments and golden parachutes through advisory shareholder voting
requirements under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. 149 The law gives
shareholders an annual advisory (i.e., non-binding) vote on executive
compensation generally (say-on-pay), and a separate advisory vote on
golden parachutes (say-on-parachutes). 150 The say-on-parachute
provision gives shareholders an opportunity to cast an advisory vote
on some forms of merger side payments such as merger bonuses,
unscheduled option grants, and augmented parachutes. 151 However, it
does not cover retention agreements or board seats offered by the
acquiring firm.
I am unaware of empirical studies examining the effectiveness of
the SEC’s new voting requirements as related to side payments. There
has, however, been empirical work examining say-on-pay in Britain.
Even though such vote is purely advisory, the British experience with
say-on-pay suggests that it may limit excessive side payments,
particularly if the payment could be characterized as a “reward for

& Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 205, 2012), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2168427.
146. See Gordon, Ties that Bond, supra note 87, at 42–43.
147. See id.
148. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2016).
149. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).
150. See id.
151. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291 § 14A(b)(2), 48 Stat. 881,
895–96 (codified at Shareholder Approval Of Executive Compensation, 15 U.S.C. § 78n1 (2012)).
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failure.” 152 Furthermore, an advisory vote on merger side payments
may have desirable ancillary effects on other areas of corporate law and
securities regulation, most importantly by forcing the target board of
directors to make an explicit voting recommendation regarding the
CEO’s side payment.
In order to recommend that shareholders vote for a particular side
payment, a voting item on the proxy statement, the board may need
to state its reasons for such advice. 153 Such disclosure is not costly in
itself, but it would force a board to come up with reasons justifying
the side payment. Furthermore, the board would need to believe that
such reasons are in fact true. If a board does not believe its own advice,
it may be open to liability under SEC Rule 14a-9 for a deceptive
opinion. 154 In the context of side payments, this means that a target’s
board would need to convince itself that the requested side payments
were in fact necessary for incentive alignment purposes. To support its
voting advice on the say-on-side payment issue, the board is likely to
monitor side payments more closely, possibly even seeking a fairness
opinion related to certain side payments. Thus, while it is too early to
tell if the say-on-side payment votes, which have only been in effect
for the past couple of years, will constrain rent extraction, there is at
least some reason for optimism.
On the other hand, the analogy to say-on-pay may break down if
an acquisition is an end-of-life event for the target firm, reducing the
shame of receiving a negative shareholder vote. A target CEO, who
does not have to return to work the next day, may be less susceptible
to shaming and other informal sanctions, at least compared to a typical
say-on-pay vote. While disclosure and advisory voting may limit rent
extraction, this does not solve the inherent problem presented
by bundling.
D. Corporate Law
Under corporate law, shareholders may seek an injunction or
damages if a merger side payment were to create sufficient conflicts to

152. See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation:
Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 528 (2013).
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2016).
154. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091–96 (1991). In
addition to showing that the directors did not believe their own opinions, a plaintiff would also
need to show that such opinions were in fact wrong. Id.
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contaminate a board’s merger recommendation. As a practical matter,
however, such conflicts will generally be cleansed through the merger
approval process, meaning the entire transaction—including the
side payment—would typically be protected by the business
judgment rule. 155
It is hard to imagine a realistic fact pattern where side payments
would be a sufficient problem for a judge to award an injunction. Even
if a conflict were truly extreme, such that it could not be adequately
cleansed or merger negotiations were conducted in bad faith, a judge
may be reluctant to issue an injunction. The judge would be presented
with the same bundled offer that shareholders and directors have an
incentive to support because it is better than the status quo.
Shareholder litigation related to the 2012 acquisition of El Paso
Corporation by Kinder Morgan illustrates the limitation of the
injunctive remedy. This deal included substantial side benefits to El
Paso’s CEO, Douglas Foshee. 156 Based on this and other conflicts, a
group of El Paso shareholders sued for an injunction. 157 The Delaware
Chancery Court judge hearing the case, Leo Strine, admitted that
conflicts of interest impacted the negotiation of the El Paso buyout.158
“[W]hen El Paso’s CEO was supposed to be getting the maximum
price from Kinder Morgan, he actually had an interest in not doing
that.” 159 Despite these facts, Chancellor Strine “reluctantly” denied
the shareholders’ motion because of the high-proposed
buyout premium. 160
The record thus persuades me that the plaintiffs have a reasonable
likelihood of success in proving that the Merger was tainted by
disloyalty. Because, however, there is no other bid on the table and
the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to
turn down the Merger themselves, the balance of harms counsels

155. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 56–62 (discussing the legal treatment of
side payments).
156. Scott Thurm, El Paso CEO Is Set for $91 Million in Exit Pay After Kinder Morgan
Deal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970
204346104576637433532101762.
157. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
158. See id. at 434.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 452; see also Michael J. de la Merced & Clifford Krauss, Kinder Morgan to Buy
El Paso for $21.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:53 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/kinder-morgan-to-buy-el-paso/?_r=0
(noting
that the deal included a 37% acquisition premium).
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against a preliminary injunction. Although the pursuit of a monetary
damages award may not be likely to promise full relief, the record
does not instill in me the confidence to deny, by grant of an
injunction, El Paso’s stockholders from accepting a transaction that
they may find desirable in current market conditions, despite the
disturbing behavior that led to the final terms. 161

Judges do not have a line-item veto, and are therefore reluctant to
strike down a multi-billion-dollar transaction because of side
payments. Judges are reluctant to use their injunctive power for the
same reason that shareholders and directors have trouble blocking
such deals—a deal with an unsavory side payment is better than no
deal at all.
A fiduciary suit for monetary damages offers more promise. In a
fiduciary suit, a judge would not have to block the entire transaction.
In theory, with full information a judge could separate the rent
extraction component from the incentive alignment component, and
appropriately set damages so as to not discourage mergers which may
require a side payment, but to set damages that penalize
rent extraction.
This view of monetary damages is problematic for several reasons.
First, it may be unrealistic to assume that a court can accurately
separate rent assignment from incentive alignment in setting damages.
If courts frequently make errors and overstate damages, this could
inadvertently discourage valuable deals from going forward. Target’s
CEO may be concerned that an incentive alignment side payment will
nonetheless be challenged in court and, fearing a non-trivial chance of
judicial error, the CEO may decide instead to block the sale altogether.
Even if we assume that courts can accurately set damages to
encourage incentive alignment and discourage rent extraction, there
is still the problem that under current law most fiduciary suits based
on a merger side payment will never even get to the damages stage of
the litigation. First, plaintiff has to successfully argue that the case is
direct rather than derivative, as target shareholders have no standing
to bring a derivate suit after a deal has been completed. 162

161. In re El Paso Corp., 41 A.3d at 434–35.
162. After a merger is completed, the derivative standing of former shareholders of the
target firm is generally extinguished. See generally Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040
(Del. 1984).
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Second, the plaintiff must successfully characterize the side
payments and other benefits received by target executives as a conflict
of interest for fiduciary purposes. After the foregoing discussion this
may seem obvious, but it is not. Indeed, courts do not generally treat
an executive’s retention agreement or acceptance of a board seat with
the acquiring firm as a conflict of interest. 163 Consequently, a board’s
recommendation of a sale involving such benefits will not receive
judicial scrutiny absent other facts.
Finally, supposing a plaintiff is able to show a conflict of interest,
that conflict will generally be cleansed through the merger approval
process. Under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section
144, a conflict of interest can be procedurally cleansed if all material
facts related to the conflict of interest are disclosed, or known, and the
transaction is then authorized by either (i) the affirmative votes of a
majority of the disinterested directors acting in good faith, 164 or (ii) a
majority of shareholder voting in good faith. 165 The result of such
cleansing is that the transaction will generally be given protection
under the business judgment rule, effectively shielding the action from
judicial review and leading to dismissal.
When DGCL 144 is applied to a conflict created by a merger side
payment, this means that the entire transaction—including the side
payment—is cleansed by an informed vote supported by a majority of
the firm’s independent directors or by an informed shareholder vote.
In the context of a merger, a vote will necessarily occur at both the
board level and at the shareholder level, meaning the conflict
associated with the side payment is effectively cleansed through
disclosure and support for the merger. 166
To be sure, the Delaware Supreme Court in a recent decision,
Gantler v. Stephens, suggests a narrower interpretation of stockholder

163. See, e.g., In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 (Del.
Ch. May 22, 2000) (holding that cash payments to target executives neither create a conflict of
interest nor breach of duty of loyalty); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No.
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (expectation of employment with the
new company is not, in itself, sufficient to establish a conflict of interest on the part of
the directors).
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2016).
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2016). Alternatively, a self-dealing transaction
can be cleansed by showing that the transaction is entirely fair to shareholders. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2016).
166. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 50.
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ratification. 167 Specifically, “the only director action or conduct that
can be ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to
approve.” 168 Applied to the context of merger side payments, this
suggests that a bundled shareholder vote approving a merger
transaction would not be sufficient to cleanse side payments to the
firm’s CEO.
Nonetheless, practitioners have found a work-around to this
problem by providing a separate shareholder vote for the issue to be
cleansed, and making the broader deal contingent on an affirmative
shareholder vote on the cleansing issue. 169 In the context of merger
side payments, this workaround effectively re-bundles the side
payment into the broader merger vote. A shareholder who wishes to
vote in favor of the merger must also vote for the issue to be cleansed.
Nonetheless, even if the target firm does not provide a separate
shareholder voting item for merger side payments as suggested by
Gantler, the side payment would be entitled to business judgment
protection by the vote of a majority of disinterested directors. 170 Under
current law, absent bad-faith negotiation tactics, 171 a merger side
payment is likely to be shielded from judicial review and such a case is
likely to be quickly dismissed. 172
VI. ANALYSIS AND LAW REFORM
In this Part, I first consider the desirability of existing laws
regulating merger side payments. I then propose two legal reforms
that may reduce the risk of rent extraction through side payments
without blocking them altogether. In particular, I consider (i) upfront
contractual restrictions limiting side payments, and (ii) an amendment
to corporate law.

167. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
168. Id. at 713.
169. See Mark J. Gentile, John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Megan R. Wischmeier, Stockholder
Ratification: A Review of the Benefits and Burdens, BLOOMBERG L. REP., Feb. 2009, at 2.
170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2016).
171. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999) (showing that bad-faith
negotiation by the CEO regarding side payments removes business judgment rule protection).
172. This assumes that the case will even be classified as a direct suit that does not need to
plead demand futility. In a post-merger fiduciary challenge, a former shareholder generally lacks
standing to bring a derivative suit.
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A. Current Law as Second Best
Even acknowledging that the law fails to prevent rent extraction,
one may still view the current set of legal protections as the best
available for an imperfect world. This view is especially attractive in
light of longstanding legal acceptance of takeover defenses such as the
poison pill. 173 Hostile takeovers have largely disappeared since the end
of the 1980s. 174 In this environment, merger side payments are one of
the few tools that can be used to overcome managerial entrenchment.
The law responds by allowing side payments, but adding disclosure
and a tax penalty for especially large side payments. This has the
benefit of facilitating a sale of the firm, while putting soft protections
in place that prevent extreme forms of rent extraction.
In further support of the current legal regime, rent extraction is
only a distributional problem. Rent extraction does not prevent the ex
post efficient outcome (sale of the firm) and it does not diminish the
size of the merger surplus. It merely redistributes benefits from
shareholders to the CEO, but the total size of the gains remains the
same. This point is easily seen in Table 2 by comparing the $3 million
side payment to the $13 million side payment. 175 In both cases, the
same merger surplus ($97 million) is created. 176 From an ex post
efficiency perspective, it does not matter whether these gains go to
shareholders or to the CEO.
Focusing exclusively on the sale, however, hides various ex ante
distortions that may arise in expectation of rent extraction. First,
expectation of a large side payment may undermine a manager’s
incentive to put forth effort throughout her employment period.
More generally, side payments undermine the disciplinary effect of the
market for corporate control. In the corporate governance literature,
the threat of losing one’s job through a takeover serves as an
important disciplining device for top executives. 177 Under the standard

173. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (validating the
use of a poison pill defensive measure).
174. See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 18, at 106 (finding that only 4% of
acquisitions between 1990 and 1998 involved a hostile bid at any point in the deal process).
175. See supra Table 2.
176. See supra Table 2.
177. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (introducing the concept of a market for corporate control and
discussing the disciplinary impact of corporate managers); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their
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view, a manager realizes that if her firm underperforms it will become
an attractive takeover target for an acquirer hoping to turn the
business around, and in the process she will lose her job as
“punishment” for poor performance. 178 Yet, the punishment loses its
bite if the CEO is able to extract a large side payment on the way out
the door. Anticipating this, a CEO may be indifferent to the threat of
takeover and invest less effort into her job ex ante. In this context, side
payments create a reward for failure.
Second, worse than merely being indifferent, a CEO may actually
seek out a merger side payment. This may cause a manager to waste
effort endogenously positioning her firm to be acquired. At the
extreme, this may even cause the firm to inefficiently change its
underlying projects to better situate itself for an acquisition. Even
though shareholders receive a merger premium from any resulting
sale, management may have caused the firm to forego some positive
net present value (NPV) projects in the pursuit of being acquired.
Third, expectation of rent extraction may raise the upfront cost of
capital. Equity investors anticipate that managers may extract value
through a side payment and they price the shares accordingly. With a
higher cost of capital some desirable projects (positive NPV) may fail
to attract financing and economic growth may be compromised. To
be sure, for publicly-held targets, merger side payments are modest
compared to the acquisition price, and target shareholders still capture
most of the gains from sale. 179 If this were the only problem, the effect
on the cost of capital would be modest. However, if we also consider
that equity investors may anticipate the distorting effect that large side
payments may have on managerial effort during the course of
employment and price this into their upfront investment, then the
effect on cost of capital potentially becomes much worse. Namely,
potential investors will demand higher upfront returns (i.e. more
equity) to compensate for value they might lose to side payments ex

Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21 (1988) (noting that threat of takeover can help
align executives’ incentives with shareholders).
178. Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 671 (1991).
179. For an angel investor or other party financing a privately-held firm, the concern over
rent extraction may be more severe, as side payments are much larger as a fraction of deal size.
See Broughman & Fried, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 25, at 1351 (noting, that when offered,
non-retention management bonuses to executives of VC-backed firms are on average 6.6% of
the merger price).
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post. Unfortunately, we cannot measure the magnitude of such ex
ante distortions, but these concerns at least cast doubt on the
optimality of current legal protections.
B. Possible Reforms
Merger side payments present a particularly difficult challenge for
law reform. Usual corporate governance mechanisms such as
disclosure and director independence are inadequate. 180 The problem
is further complicated by the fact that side payments are sometimes
necessary to counter managerial entrenchment. Any reform that
blocks side payments runs the risk that it may prevent transactions
desired by shareholders. Managerial entrenchment is potentially a
much worse problem than rent extraction. 181
In Section VI.B, I consider two possible reforms that may reduce
the use of side payments as rent extraction without blocking them
altogether. First, I evaluate contractual restrictions on side payments,
noting two limitations of this approach: (i) waiver through bundled
renegotiation and (ii) inability to specify the incentive alignment
payment ex ante. Second, I propose a small amendment to corporate
law. Firms should be given the choice to opt into a heightened
fiduciary standard by placing language in their charters requiring that
any side benefit received by the CEO can only be cleansed via a
separate vote upon which the broader acquisition cannot
be contingent.
1. Contract
The relationship between a firm and its CEO is part of the broader
nexus of contractual relations that define an organization. 182
Consequently one might hope that a contractual provision could be
designed to limit rent extraction through merger side payments. For
example, when negotiating over a CEO’s employment contract the
180. See supra Sections V.C & V.D.
181. Furthermore, some side payments—such as retention agreements, non-competes, and
post-merger consulting—may be desired by acquirers, and may increase the size of the merger
surplus. An acquirer may be willing to pay more for the target firm if it is able to retain key
employees, and design appropriate contracts to incentivize such individuals going forward.
Consequently, any reform proposal that interferes with an acquirer’s ability to offer a retention
agreement to target executives would probably lead to worse problems than the risk of rent
extraction under the current law.
182. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (describing corporate entities as a nexus of contractual relations).
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firm could ask for a provision limiting the dollar amount that the CEO
can receive through any form of merger side payment to some capped
amount. This can be thought of as an iron weight attached to the
CEO’s golden parachute.
To illustrate with a concrete example, the CEO may bargain for a
golden parachute that entitles her to a payment equal to $1.5M if the
firm is acquired, and the employer may ask for an iron weight that
limits the total amount of “merger benefits”—including both golden
parachutes and side payments—that the CEO can receive from any
future acquisition to $2M. This would effectively give the CEO
freedom to negotiate up to $0.5M in side payments in addition to her
contractual entitlement to a $1.5M parachute. “Merger benefits”
would need to be defined broadly in the merger agreement so that it
includes all forms of side payments including excess compensation
(above a defined amount) received through a retention contract or
post-merger consulting from the acquirer, and a remedy would need
to be specified (e.g. clawback) if the CEO were to receive
excess payments.
Putting aside definitional concerns and questions about the
enforceability of a restriction on compensation from an acquiring firm
as future employer, 183 there is an appeal to the iron-weight contract
clause. Whereas a golden parachute entitles the CEO to a defined
payment upon a change-in-control, an iron weight would set a
limitation on the amount that a CEO could extract through extra side
payments. By setting the iron-weight cap at the right level this
provision may limit rent extraction without blocking
incentive alignment.
There are, however, two serious limitations that apply to any
contractual solution. The first concern is that, under existing law,
contracting parties cannot prevent consensual renegotiation of their
original contract. 184 This is an oft-noted problem in the literature on

183. The acquirer is not a party to the contract provision and the iron weight restriction
may be viewed as type of a non-compete that places unreasonable constraints on future
employment. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 379, 391–92 (2006) (discussing limited enforceability of non-compete agreement).
184. This is an oft-noted problem in the literature on contract theory. See, e.g., Christine
Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (1997) (suggesting potential benefits from a commitment to
not renegotiate).
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contract theory, and is especially problematic in the context of merger
side payments. 185 To illustrate, a CEO could negotiate a desirable
M&A sale where waiver of the iron weight is a condition to closing
the sale. The CEO could then negotiate for a large side payment (in
excess of the iron-weight cap) and bundle all of this together into one
deal. Technically, the board would need to consent separately to a
waiver of the iron-weight provision. But the arrangement would be
bundled such that the board cannot authorize the merger agreement
without first waiving the iron weight. 186 The CEO’s agenda-setting
power is used here to remove an inconvenient (to her)
contractual restriction.
For the same reason that side payments can be bundled into a
merger agreement, a waiver or amendment of any contract provision
can be bundled into a merger. The CEO has agenda-setting power to
construct a bundled deal, which the board and shareholders are forced
to accept or reject through a take-it-or-leave-it vote. The parties may
try to address this problem up front by requiring a supermajority vote
for any amendment to the iron weight provision, but even this is
inadequate because it is rational for all directors and all shareholders
to waive the iron weight when it is bundled into a desirable sale of
the firm. 187
A second concern with any contractual solution is that the parties
may be unable to specify with any precision the incentive alignment
payment ex ante. This amount may depend on non-verifiable future
contingencies that cannot be contracted over ex ante. Given an
incomplete contract setup the parties may be reluctant to specify an
iron weight that could inadvertently block a desirable merger by
setting the incentive alignment compensation too low. In this case it
may be a good thing that the parties can renegotiate ex ante
provisions. But it also suggests that an ex ante iron-weight contract
may be a pointless exercise that at best merely increases transactions
costs, and at worst may prevent a valuable sale from occurring.

185. See id.
186. See supra Part IV.
187. For example, the parties may consider trying to add this provision to the corporate
charter, such that it requires shareholder consent—possibly at a supermajority level—to modify
the iron-weight provision.
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2. Corporate law reform
Given the inability of a contract to prevent rent extraction, I
propose a small amendment to corporate law. Firms should be given
the choice to opt into a heightened fiduciary standard by placing
language in their charter requiring that any side benefit received by
the CEO—and possibly other members of senior management—can
only be cleansed via a separate vote, upon which the broader
acquisition cannot be contingent.
The problem with the existing law is it treats authorization of a
merger as authorization of each component of the deal (merger and
side payment). 188 Yet, shareholders and directors only vote on the
combined bundle rather than on each part separately. Shareholder
approval of a bundled vote does not mean that each element of the
deal is good for shareholders. It merely means that the entire
transaction is better than no deal at all. The shareholders may still
disfavor the side payment component.
One way to implement an opt-in reform would be to limit DGCL
sections 144(a)(1) and (a)(2)—provisions describing the cleansing of
conflict-of-interest transactions—to director or shareholder votes that
were in some meaningful sense unbundled from the broader merger
authorization. At a minimum, this would require a separate board or
shareholder vote authorizing the side payment. Such vote must not be
tied to the passage of a specific merger transaction. For example, if the
merger agreement made acceptance of the side payment a condition
to closing, the side payment obviously would not be unbundled, even
if shareholders were given a chance to vote on the side payment
separate from the broader merger vote. Informed shareholders would
understand that they need to vote yes on the side payment if they want
the merger to go forward; the mere presence of a separate voting item
would be irrelevant.
Board or shareholder authorization of a side payment could either
occur: (i) prior to the vote on a specific M&A transaction (pre-deal
vote); or (ii) at the same time as the M&A vote (concurrent vote). A
side payment authorized by a pre-deal vote is functionally a golden
parachute, since the payout would be set prior to the terms of a merger
agreement. If a pre-deal vote occurs in close proximity to a specific
merger transaction, one may worry that this arrangement reflects an
informal or implicit form of bundling. Shareholders may correctly

188. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text.
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understand that if they vote against a pre-deal side payment they are
effectively rejecting a potential merger proposal.
As long as the acquisition terms have not yet been set, however,
this is not actually bundling, but rather reflects the reality that
management has a credible threat to block a sale of the firm. To see
the distinction, note that if the shareholders vote in favor of a pre-deal
side payment, the amount of side payment is now fixed. Management
can subsequently bargain with an acquirer over the sale of the firm,
but management cannot trade off merger premium for a larger side
payment, since the side payment is fixed in advance. Put another way,
authorization by a pre-deal vote may be necessary to get management
to the negotiation table, but once they are at the table their bargaining
incentives are aligned with shareholder welfare.
By contrast, a side payment authorized by a concurrent vote may
be problematic for the opposite reason. Here the merger and the side
payment are separate voting items on the same proxy card (i.e.
corporate ballot). 189 Management puts the merger up for vote without
knowing if they will receive the side payment, and for cleansing
purposes, the merger itself cannot be made contingent on whether the
side payment received shareholder support. 190 If the side payment is
necessary for incentive alignment purposes the CEO may be very
reluctant to go this route. To avoid the possibility that shareholders
may decline to approve an ex post side payment, firms would be
encouraged to address the problem ex ante by adopting a golden
parachute (i.e. a pre-deal side payment).
My proposal does not attempt to block side payments; rather, it
switches the level of judicial scrutiny based on how the side payment
is authorized. If a side payment is authorized by an informed
shareholder vote or by a vote of the independent directors, and such
vote is decoupled from the merger itself, then (absent other problems)
the transaction should be entitled to protection under the business
judgment rule. By contrast, if a side payment is important for incentive
alignment purposes and the deal planners do not want to expose it to
shareholder or independent director vote, then they can still go
forward with the sale and include the side payment, but the
189. The vote here would be concurrent, since the two items would be voted on at the
same time.
190. After numerous shareholder complaints, this form of voting appears to have been the
outcome in the XTRATA acquisition. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Gamesmanship in XstrataGlencore Merger Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2012/10/25/gamesmanship-in-xstrata-glencore-merger-vote/?_r=0.
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transaction is no longer entitled to business judgment rule protection.
Rather, the transaction would be scrutinized under the entire fairness
standard, meaning that courts would inquire into whether the side
payment was desirable for shareholders of the target firm. This
approach is only a small departure from the existing law.
Indeed, I have intentionally made this a fairly modest proposal out
of concern that any more aggressive constraints on side payments may
inadvertently increase managerial entrenchment. For this reason, I
also suggest that this reform should be one that firms choose whether
to opt-into or not. There is no reason that this needs to be a
mandatory requirement. Instead, shareholders can decide whether
they value extra protection against side payments, or whether they
prefer the status quo. I believe my proposal could reduce the CEO’s
agenda-setting power with respect to side payments, while still giving
firms flexibility to compensate the CEO for negotiating a sale of
the business.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I propose a new theory for merger side payments
that helps explain evidence of rent extraction through side payments.
While a typical agency conflict is driven by shareholders’ inability to
observe bad behavior and lack of incentive to invest effort-monitoring
management, merger side payments present a different problem.
Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular bill, target CEOs can
use control over the corporate agenda to bundle an opportunistic side
payment into a desired merger transaction, thereby making it
impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without
also voting against the merger. Because side payments are bundled
into a merger transaction, disclosure and voting rights cannot
adequately protect shareholders against rent extraction. Instead, I
propose a small reform to corporate law to help unbundle side
payments from the broader merger vote, forcing the CEO to give up
some of her agenda-setting power with respect to the design of
side payments.
This project contributes to literature on bundling in corporate law.
My theory suggests testable predictions for comparing rent extraction
through golden parachutes and merger side payments. I hope that
future researchers will test these predictions, and that my analysis will
be useful to judges and other policy makers addressing merger
side payments.
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